ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND TRE NEW THEORY OF THE FIRM: FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND RISK BEHAVIOR by Bruce C. Greenwald et al.
NEER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ANDTHENEW THEORY OF THE FIRM:
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND RISK BEHAVIOR
Bruce C. Greenwald
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Working Paper No. 3359
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
May 1990
is paper is part of NBERs research program in Financial Markets and Monetary
onomics.Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of
•.e National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #3359
May 1990
ASYMMETRICINFORMATION AND TRE NEWTHEORY OF THE FIRM:
FINANCIALCONSTRAINTS AND RISK BEHAVIOR
ABSTRACT
Thispaper summarizes recent developments in the theory of the firm
that have arisen in examining the implications of imperfect information.It
shows that a wide range of these models have similar implications for the
likely reaction of firms to external environmental and policy changes.Two
significant implicationsare(1)that firms behave asif they are risk
averseindividualsmaximizingautilityfunctionofterminalwealth
(profitability) -.evenwhen the risks involved are unsystematic --and(2),
in many circumstances,becausethisutilityfunctionislikelytobe
characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion,firms are likely to
respondsignificantly(andpositively)tochangesincashflowand
profitability.Together these two phenomena are able to account for a wide
range of firm behaviors that have been empirically observed (both formally
andinformally)andthataredifficulttoexplainintermsofthe
traditional theory of the firm.Furthermore, the responses of such firms to
policyinterventionsarelikelytodiffersignificantlyfromthoseof
neoclassical firms.
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Recent developments in the theory of the firm—beyondboth its Arrow-Debreu incarna-
tion as a disembodied production set and its formulation, due to Coase and Williamson [19851,
as an efficient nexus for minimizing the cost of economic transactions —havebeen closely
related to developments in examining the economic implications of imperfect information.
Asymmetrically distributed information between a finn, as employer, and its workers has
replaced the traditional view of a finn which hires labor at fixed (or monopsonistically increas-
ing) wages in well-defined labor markets with one in which firms activelymanage long-term
employment relationships, on average pay wages in excess of those available,on average, in the
labor market at large, control workers with carefully designed incentive mechanisms and often
ration access to jobs. Similar asymmetries of information between outside investors, whopro-
vide capital, and inside managers, who control its use, have lead to comparable developments in
the theory of how firms acquire and deploy capital. In bothcases, there have been two dimen-
sions to the theoretical developments involved. On the one hand, muchrecent attention has been
paid to the internal structure of the firm—howrewards for individual workers should be
designed, what constitutes appropriate hierarchical or reporting structures, how the internal qual-
ity of life of the firm depends on these factors. On the other hand,a new view of the external
aspect of the firm —howit is likely to react to external environmental and policy changes—
hasdeveloped. The focus of this paper is on the latter external dimension since developments in
this area have begun to lead to a broadly common set of implications for firm behavior.
Among these developments those with perhaps the most striking implications for external
firm behavior have arisen from a reexamination of the role of financial variables (leverage, cash
reserves, financial• strength, etc.). The classical Modigliani-Miller approach to financial policy
concluded that the financial structure of a finn was irrelevant to both its value and its operating
decisions and the neoclassical theory of the firm assumed further that its financial positionwas-3-
irrelevant. Yet both informal observations and systematic empirical evidence have suggested
that financial structure and position are of considerable importance to firm behavior. For exam-
ple, notions of deep pockets or financial strength which have always played a significant role in
qualitative observations of firm behavior have no place in a classical Modigliani-Miller world,
while recent empirical studies of investment have demonstrated the importance of financial vari-
ables.
Models of imperfect information in financial markets have altered the traditional view in
two important ways. First, if information is asymmetrically distributed between the buyers and
sellers of financial instruments, then certain financial markets, such as that for equities, may
break down or be severely limited —aform of the lemons problem identified by Akerlof [1970]
—andaccordingly the free access to all forms of financing envisaged by Modigliani-Miller may
not exist.In loan markets, there may be credit rationing.In these cases financial structure and
position matter and affect firm behavior. Second, if information is asymmetrically distributed
between those who make decisions (agents) and the theoretical beneficiaries of those decisions
(principals), then the reward functions which govern firm decision-making may not have the
form of simple valuation maximization assumed in the neoclassical theory. This paper seeks to
examine the consequences of both kinds of imperfections for the behavior of firms and their evo-
lution over time. In doing so, it looks at an exemplary case of imperfect competition and explicit
investment in long-run research and development. However, the lessons of that model point
more broadly to the general direction in which informational imperfections in financial markets
affect the external dimension of firm behavior.-4-
TheModel
We will assume for expository purpose that firm decision-making takes place intwo dis-
tinct stages. In the first stage, the firm decides on a level of productivity improving activity,x.
This may be interpreted as either explicit research and development spendingor as spending on
an overhead establishment whose task is to improve the firm's productivity, broadly construedto
include the efficiency of its marketing and general aththnistrañve activities.The activity reduces
the constant marginal cost of output with which a firm enters thesecondstage of market activity,
in which output is produced and sold. This constant marginalcost, c,willbe assumed to depend
on an inherited level of production knowledge, c0, which depends on the spillover benefits of
past economy-wide productivity improving activities; on first stage overhead expendituresto
improve productivity, x, which we will refer to for convenienceas R&D; and on a random fac-
tor, s,withexpected value one, which determines the success of those efforts:
c=sg(x)c0 ,E(s)=1
wherethe function g is assumed to be decreasing inx.
In the second stage of market activity, firms maximize profits, given theircost levels and
the demand for their product, d,whichwe assume depends on both the firm's own price, p. and
the average price, ,chargedby other firms. Formally, therefore, in the second stage firms
maxit=(p—c)dQ, ,j)
whichleads to an optimal price and profit level
mc,m = 11(1—lie)
and
r =(m—1)cd(mc,m),-5-
wherecisthe average of the cost of other firms and eisthe own price elasticity of the demand
function, d,assumedto be a constant.
The pay-off function to first stage R&D activity is, therefore,
it(x)=(m—1)sg(x)c0d(,nSg(X)C0,mc).
Ifthere are a large number of competing firms, then c will be approximately equal to gc0, where
jisthe average of g (x) over other firms and c0, the initial inherited technology, is assumed to
be the same for all firms (i.e. technologies fully spillover into the public domain after a single
period). The second stage profit function can, thus, be written
t(x)=(m—1)sg(x)c0 d(sg(x),g)
wherethe m and c0 terms in the demand function have been suppressed for notational conveni-
ence. Profits are a random variable looking forward fromthe beginning of the first stage in
which x has been chosen.
The choice of a level of research activity in stage one depends on the objective functionof
a firm at that time and, in particular, on its attitudetoward risk. We assume that the firm in ques-
tion is owned and managed by an individual who maximizes the utility of end-of-periodwealth,
having sold a fraction (I —a)of the firm to outside investors. Thus, in stage one, the firm
decision-maker maximizes expected utility,
maxE[u(w+Øt(x)—x)a)] (1)
x
wherewe assume that u is characterized by decreasing absoluterisk aversion and w, initial
wealth, includes the proceeds from the sale of the fraction (1—a) of the firm. For the casein
which the risks associated with x are unsystematic, such an entrepreneur, in a world of perfect
information, would diversify completely and simply maximize the expected value of t(x).-6-
However, if he both is and is known to be better informed about his own prospects for produc-
tivity improvement than investors at large, then the firm's owner/manager will be constrainedto
hold an excessive fraction of the firm in order to signal confidence in hisown prospects.1 And
firm behavior, even with respect to the unsystematic risks that are associated with active produc-
tivity improvements, will be governed by the risk aversion implied by the utility function in
equation (1).
An objective function similar to that of equation (I), or at least with similar implications,
emerges from a wide range of imperfect information models.For example, the distinction
between owner-managed and professionally managed firms is not especially significant here.
When professional managers' actions are unobservable, in effectmanagers become part owners
of their firms' equity capital. The managers' wealth then consists of their private holdings,w,
plusthe fraction, a, of the terminal equity (profit) of the firm which theyare able to appropriate
to their own use. Since this latter part of their wealth is non-tangible and since themanagers,
like owners, should be deterred from issuing shares by informational considerations,managers
will be maximizing a function similar to that of equation (1). Alternatively, ifagency arrange-
ments are made with risk averse managers and these arrangements are limited for practicalrea-
sons to pay-offs which are linear in the profits of the firm, an objective function identical to that
of equation (1) will emerge, with the variable,a, now representing the slope of the pay-off func-
tion and wnowbeing the returns to safe projects (i.e., liquid investments).
Similarly, since the fact that issuing shares hasa negative impact on the market value of the
firm makes the firm reluctant to issue shares, if external fundsare raised it will in theory be (and
in practice is) predominantly through loans. But this makes the firm facea risk of bankruptcy, a
risk which is affected by firm behavior. Wecan show that the behavior generated by maximiz--7-
ing expected profits minus an expected cost of bankruptcy (the cost of bankruptcy times the pro-
bability of bankruptcy) is similar to that generated by equation (1) under plausible restrictions on
the firm's cost and probability of bankruptcy. Thus, if professional managers are subject to an
agency arrangement which either explicitly orinformally rewards them with a share of profits,
but imposes a large penalty in the event of bankruptcy (i.e. dismissal with a stigma which
significantly impairs future earnings), then the resulting objective function produces behavior
almost exactly identical with that of equation (1),2 when(as we assume here) the utility function
is characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion.
The first order condition for the problem of equation (1) can be written
c0d'(—g) = d / d + coy (U 'ds ) + coy (ds) (2)
where E[u '1 hasbeen normalized to equal one. Both covariances are negative (since better out-
comes for research activities are correlated with higher sales ant sale revenues) (—g) is positive.
The right-hand side of this equation is the risk adjusted cost of research investment at the mar-
gin.It is least when the firm is risk neutral (i.e.coy(U 'ds) = 0)and increases with firm risk
aversion. The left-hand side is the marginal return to research expenditures. Assuming the
appropriate second order condition is satisfied, the behavior of a finance and/or agency con-
strained firm can be derived straightforwardly from equation (2). Broadly speaking these firms
act as if they are risk averse individuals, which is not surprising since one basic impact of imper-
fect information is to interfere with the proper distribution of risk.
A first consequence of this is that an increase in the wealth of firm owners (financial
strength of the firm) leads to reductions in the size of the covariances and hence a reduction in
the risk premium associated with overhead investment. Thus, as a rule, increases in historical
firm profitability and/or temporarily high current profitability (increasing w)leadto higher-8-
levelsof research investment (or investment generally), more rapid expected productivity
growth for each firm and, throughfuture spillovereffects, higher productivity for the economy
as a whole. Consequently, temporary demand disturbances which reduce current profitability
will lead to effective supply contractions (as in a standard Keynesian model as firms reduce
investment activity, R&D, etc.) and these, in turn, lead to permanently lower future output. Not
only is the informal notion of the importance of the strength of a firm's financial position vali-
dated in these imperfect information models but they also provide a mechanism for the propaga-
tion of macroeconomic demand disturbances and the persistence of their effects.
Increases in the uncertainty of the technological or future market environment (i.e. in the
variance of s)havea similar impact. The risk premium associated with investment rises, even
when the risks involved are unsystematic, and the level of research investment falls. Ultimately,
therefore, productivity growth declines across the economy as a whole. The imperfect perfor-
mance of financial mechanisms for risk distribution means that an economy may react negatively
to increases in variables like relative price uncertainty (which affect the uncertainty of returns to
productivity improvement). These are all, it should be noted, effects which are not part of the
responses of the traditional firm.
Dynamics
Another significant aspect of the finance constrained firm is that it is characterized by a
well-defined dynamic evolution, which depends on the evolution of the owner/manager's wealth
(or in the case of a managerial firm, the accumulated retained earnings of the firm). The wealth
of a firm's owner in period tisdetermined by the relationship
w1=a ir(x1)+(w —ax)(l-4-r1)—y1(w,) (3)-9-
where r, is a safe rate of return on assets notinvested in the firm at stage one, Yt is consumption
in period r which is an increasing functionof wealth in period r, and, as described above, x is
the level of investment in research and developmentwhich depends positively on w; namely
;=h(w1)h'>O.4
For an individual firm, this is a stochastic difference equation,since ic(x1) is a random variable,
depending on the random return variable s. Under reasonable circumstances (abounded distri-
bution of s, sufficiently rapidly diminishing returns to x and sufficiently concavepreferences) a
limitingdistributionof w1, independent of initial wealth, will exist.5
Among other factors this limiting distribution will dependinthepresentmodel on the
wealth levels of other firm owners. Higher economy-wide wealth levels implyhigher economy-
wide levels of research and development spending, lower expected costs and hence pricesfor
competing firms, lower expected demand at each own price le :1 for any single firm, andthere-
fore, lower expected profits for each firm. Thus, for the economy as a whole,there will be in
equilibrium (again under reasonable circumstances) a limiting distribution of wealth acrossfirms
which implies a limiting distribution across firms of research and development expenditures.
Finally, the long run evolution of the model depends on the evolution of c0 which embo-
dies the inherited technology in each period. In order to simplify matters as far as possible we
will assume that the demand function at t,d1(p, ,p,), has the form
d,(p,,pj)= (1 /c0(r))d(p,/
As inherited costs fall, real income rises, demand increases proportionately and the shareof
demand served by each individual firm depends on its price relative to the average price of all
other firms. Under these conditions, t(x) and the level of x, chosen by each finn is independent-10-
of c0(:). Thus, the analysis of the dynamics of the model can be separated into U) an analysis
(described above) of the evolution of the wealths and research and development expenditures of
individual firms and (2) an analysis of the overall improvement in the baseline technology of the
economy, embodied in c0, as a function of the wealth and R&D spending distributions.For-
mally, that second step can be described by an equation of the form
c0 (r+l)=c0 (r)G (x,)
which describes the process of technology spillovers where x, is a vector whose elements are the
levels of x, for the individual firms.
In order to trace the long-term consequences of any environmental or policy change within
this context, its consequences for the evolution of both the wealth distribution of firm owners
and technology must be examined. For example, an unexpected increase in the wealth of firm
owners (due, for example, to an unexpected increase in demand in a single period will not alter
the limiting distribution of firm-owner wealth or research and development expenditures.It will
not, therefore, alter the long-run growth rate of productivityHowever, it will temporarily
increase research and development expenditures, leading to an increase in the level of produc-
tivity. Consequently the new limiting growth path will involve a permanently higher level of
output.
An increase in envimnmental uncertainty (due for example to greater policy instability or
to greater uncertainty in the results of research efforts) will in the short run lead to a reduction in
research and development efforts at the initial existing levels of firm-owner wealth. However,
the decline in economy-wide research and development expenditures will tend to increase the
profitability of such efforts by individual firms both on average and at the margin. The marginal
effect involved will in the short run partially offset the original impact of greater uncertainty on— 11—
risk-averse firm-owners. The increase in averageprofitability will lead to wealth accumulation
by firm-owners and, over time, to apartial restoration in research and development expenditures.
On balance, the increase in uncertainty isstill likely to lead to lower R&D expenditures and
lower growth rates of productivity. However, the extentof the initial decline will be partially
offset by subsequent wealth accumulation. Thus, analysis of both the ultimate sizeand the tem-
poral pattern of the response of the economy to a change in uncertainty (or to a deliberatepolicy
change, like a tax increase) requires that the long-term effects of firm-ownerwealth change be
taken into account.
Conclusion
Imperfect information affects both the internal organization of firms and its external rela-
tions with labor, capital and product markets. The new theory of the firm is built on these foun-
dations.This theory has important behavioral implications •iichdistinguish it from earlier
neoclassical theories.This paper, focusing on informational problems in the capital market,
including asymmetries of information between providers of capital and firm managers, has
argued that as a result firms will act in a risk averse manner. Several consequences follow:(i)
the firm will be concerned with its financial structure, and financial structure affects behavior
(ii) changes in financial strength (the firm's net worth) have real consequences; arid (iii) mean
preserving changes in distributions of prices and sales have real effects. Elsewhere (Greenwald
and Stiglitz [19891) we have shown that the appropriate way to look at the whole set of firm
decisions —includingthose relating to employment, production, pricing, investment (including
inventory changes) and research—isas a dynamic portfolio problem. The results of that model
can be contrasted both with the simple neoclassical model of the firm and with attempts to make
that model accommodate more of the facts concerning firm behavior, in particular, these postu-- 12-
laungcosts of adjustment. In some cases, to attain patterns of behavior consistent with the facts
—suchas the greater variability in quantities than in prices —requiresimplausible assumptions
concerning adjustment costs. But even in those cases where the neoclassical models and their
exterior yield someresultswhich are consistent with observation, they fail to account for the
facts that firm outputand investmentspending (in R&D and of other sorts) respond directly to
changes in firm wealth and to envimnmental uncertainty of an unsystematic sort, while our
models support much of the empirical literature that relates variables like investment directly to
firm financial conditions, and more informally, to conditions of uncertainty (due for example to
high inflation or unstable government policy) in the economy at large (even when these appear
unlikely to lead to increases in systematic risk). Here we have used the theory of the finance
constrained firm to explore the dynamics of firm and economy-wide growth. These models have
strong policy implications that while corresponding to widely held informal views, often differ
markedly from those based on the neoclassical theory of the firm and its derivatives.- 13-
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FOOTNOTES
1.See Leland and Pyle [1977].
2.See Greenwald and Stiglitz [1987]. This requires that bankruptcy costs increase with the
size of the firm (as they appear to do in practice).
3.The discussion below assumes implicitly that the ownership factora does not change with
the exogenous variables. In the pure finance constrained interpretation this is appropriate.
In the agency interpretations a may change.However, the basic comparative static pro-
perties of the model are unaltered.
4.In a more general model, we can derive the equilibriumY1 (we)functionalso.
5.Thisholds as long as the basic firm decision problem is unaltered by changes in c0,which
requires that the demand function facing each firm increases linearly with I/c0 (i.e. real
income).